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Rent-seeking is the effort to earn income through politically created privileges rather than through market performance. The expenditures it involves create no new value; they merely shift it.

See also:
Public Choice , Corporatism , Price Controls , Welfare State

Rent-seeking refers to the attempt to earn income not through performance in the market, but through politically created privileges. The term comes from public choice research. In 1967, Gordon Tullock described how tariffs and monopolies tie up resources; in 1974, Anne Krueger coined the expression. “Rent” here does not mean a retirement pension, as the German word “Rente” might suggest, but the extra profit from a scarce position secured by the state, such as a license, an import quota, or a subsidy.

The crucial point is that the pursuit of such privileges is itself costly: lobbying offices, law firms, trade associations, campaign donations. These expenditures create no new value; they shift it. For the economy as a whole, that is a loss, even if it does not show up as one in any statistics.

For the liberty of the individual, this has a twofold consequence. Those with access to decision-makers win predictably. Those who only work and trade lose in relative terms. Incentives thus move away from innovation and customer benefit toward relationship management. Those who consider rent-seeking unavoidable point out that interest groups exist under every order. The objection carries weight. But it describes a problem with the rules that set incentives, and it does not justify an economy of favors.

The remedy is general rules instead of case-by-case favors: equal rights for all, no special licenses, open markets. The fewer places there are where a privilege can be requested, the less energy flows into this game.

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