In 1971, John Rawls, a philosopher at Harvard University, published A Theory of Justice. The book quickly became one of the most influential philosophical justifications of the redistributive welfare state: inequalities, it argued, are just only if they also benefit the worst off, and a society’s institutions must see to it that they do.
Three years later, the reply came from the same department. Its author was seventeen years younger than Rawls and, as a student, had founded the local chapter of a socialist student organization. Anarchy, State, and Utopia opens with a sentence that contains the entire program: individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them without violating those rights. Robert Nozick received the National Book Award for the book in 1975, and from then on libertarianism was a position that academic philosophy had to take seriously.
At a glance
- Life: November 16, 1938, in Brooklyn, New York, to January 23, 2002, in Cambridge, Massachusetts
- Work: professor of philosophy at Harvard University from 1969, Joseph Pellegrino University Professor from 1998
- Major works: Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), Philosophical Explanations (1981), The Examined Life (1989), The Nature of Rationality (1993), Invariances (2001)
- Awards: National Book Award 1975 for Anarchy, State, and Utopia
- In one sentence: He showed that the minimal state can be justified from the rights of the individual and described it as an open framework in which people can live out their own utopias.
A Socialist Discovers Rights
Nozick grew up in Brooklyn, the son of a Jewish family with Russian roots; his father ran a small business. At Columbia College, where he graduated in 1959, he founded the local chapter of the Student League for Industrial Democracy, which in 1962 gave rise to Students for a Democratic Society, one of the most important organizations of the American New Left. At Princeton he earned his doctorate in 1963 under Carl Hempel with a dissertation on decision theory.
The path to different convictions was paved by a friend from Princeton, Bruce Goldberg, who introduced him to the economist Murray Rothbard. In the preface to his major work, Nozick names a long conversation with Rothbard as what prompted him to take up the theory of individualist anarchism. Looking back in a 1977 interview, he said he had always held an entitlement theory and had only needed to work out which entitlements were the right ones.
In 1969, at the age of thirty, Nozick became a full professor at Harvard, where he taught until his death. After Anarchy, State, and Utopia he turned to epistemology, rationality, questions of the good life, and metaphysics. He died in 2002 at 63 of stomach cancer, which he had suffered from since 1994, and remained in his post to the end.
How a State Can Arise Without Doing Wrong
The book has three parts, and each answers a different side. The first is addressed to the anarchists, whose objections Nozick examines at length. He imagines a state of nature in which people join private protective agencies to defend their rights. Over time one agency comes to dominate a territory, and step by step it becomes a minimal state that guards against force, theft, and fraud and enforces contracts. What matters for Nozick is that this path is possible without anyone’s rights having to be violated.
The second part is addressed to everyone who wants to give the state more tasks. Its thesis: no state more extensive than the minimal state can be justified. And the third part speaks to the dreamers, for it shows that the same minimal state, as Nozick already says in the preface, is right and at the same time inspiring.
This combination is what makes the book special. While many defenders of the market argue from prosperity and efficiency, Nozick appeals to respect for persons: people, he puts it in Kantian language, may not be sacrificed or used for the ends of others without their consent (p. 31).
Justice Has a History
Most philosophers of his day asked what shape a just distribution must have: according to need, according to merit, or so that the weakest are as well off as possible. Nozick called such approaches patterned theories, because they prescribe a particular pattern, and set his entitlement theory against them. On this view, whether someone rightfully owns something depends solely on how he acquired it. Whatever came about through legitimate original acquisition or through voluntary transfer, that is, exchange or gift, is just; where robbery or fraud occurred, the injustice must be rectified. “Justice in holdings is historical,” he writes (p. 152 of the original edition): it is a matter of what actually happened.
His own short formula plays on the old socialist slogan “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.” In Nozick it reads: “From each as they choose, to each as they are chosen” (p. 160).
Wilt Chamberlain’s Tickets
The entitlement theory became famous through an example from basketball. Nozick asks the reader to imagine a society in which exactly the distribution he himself considers just prevails. Now the basketball star Wilt Chamberlain agrees with his team that he will receive 25 cents from every ticket. Over the season a million spectators gladly pay to watch him play, and in the end Chamberlain has $250,000 more than before and far more than anyone else.
If the starting point was just and everyone paid voluntarily with what belonged to him, it is hard to say where the injustice is supposed to lie. Anyone who wants to restore the old distribution must take from Chamberlain what was given to him of people’s own free will, and would have to do so again and again, because people will go on exchanging and giving. Liberty, the conclusion runs, upsets every pattern, and anyone who wants to secure a pattern permanently must permanently prevent people from deciding for themselves what to do with their property.
From this reasoning follows what is perhaps the most quoted sentence in the book: “Taxation of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor” (p. 169). The reason, according to Nozick, is that whoever takes from a person the fruits of several hours of work is disposing of those hours of his life.
Nozick also took seriously the question of what follows from past injustice, and it is part of his theory. Many present-day holdings go back to earlier injustice. At the end of the chapter on justice he therefore considers lump-sum compensation for those who were probably harmed, and thinks it conceivable that a more extensive state might be needed in the short run to do this. At the same time he warns that his analysis cannot be used to condemn any existing system of transfer payments as long as the historical facts are not known in detail.
A Framework for Many Utopias
The third part is the warmest in the book. Nozick asks what the best of all possible worlds would look like and concludes that there cannot be one for all people at once, because people are too different. What makes a fulfilling life possible for one person would be an imposition for another.
The utopia he proposes is therefore a framework for utopias, in his words, utopia is “meta-utopia” (p. 312): a place where people can join together voluntarily and try out their ideas of the good life. Religious congregations, cooperatives, socialist settlements, and communities of strict property owners can exist side by side. Each, Nozick says, must win and keep the voluntary agreement of its members (p. 316), and anyone who wants to leave may leave. No one knows in advance which way of life is best, and so this framework works like a discovery procedure in Hayek’s sense, in which trial reveals what people really want.
Nozick found an example of this in Israel. In the essay “Who Would Choose Socialism?” (1978), he estimated that in the 1970s about six percent of adult Israelis had chosen life on a kibbutz, a communal life in the midst of a society that required it of no one. Anyone who wants to live in solidarity and with shared property thus has a place in Nozick’s framework, as long as he does not force others to do the same.
The same book contains a thought experiment that became known far beyond political philosophy. Nozick asks whether you would plug into an experience machine for the rest of your life, one that would give you the illusion of any experience you wanted, success, friendship, and love included. He assumes you would decline, and explains why: we want to actually do things and actually be a certain kind of person, rather than merely have the feeling of it (pp. 42–45).
What Friends of Liberty Can Learn from Nozick
The first lesson is the Chamberlain argument itself. It does not assume that the reader already thinks like a libertarian: you may start with your own favorite distribution and still end up facing the question of by what right Chamberlain’s money is taken from him.
The second lesson concerns how we look at justice. Those who ask how something came about, instead of looking only at the outcome, do not automatically see injustice in inequality. An unequal distribution can be entirely just if it results from voluntary choices.
The third lesson is perhaps the most important for public debate. Nozick’s framework for utopias offers a counter to the image of a cold libertarianism, because it invites everyone to realize his idea of the good life with like-minded people, as long as he imposes it on no one. And finally, Nozick showed that libertarian arguments hold their own in the most demanding academic discussion. The Times Literary Supplement counted his book among the hundred most influential books since World War II, and Rothbard’s detailed reply of 1977, which attacked the minimal state from an anarchist standpoint, also shows how seriously it was taken within the liberty movement itself.
A Thinker Who Kept Asking
Nozick never updated his major work, and in 1989 he wrote in The Examined Life that the libertarian position he had once propounded now seemed to him seriously inadequate, because it had not knit humane considerations and joint cooperative activity closely enough into its fabric (pp. 286–87). Many read this as a renunciation. In a 2001 interview with the journalist Julian Sanchez, he made clear that he was simply no longer as strict a libertarian as before, but that the rumors of his defection from libertarianism were greatly exaggerated. In Invariances, his last book, published the same year, he wrote that all a society may demand by coercion is adherence to an ethics of respect (p. 282).
That he kept thinking instead of clinging to one book fits a philosopher who placed the self-directed life above any prescribed pattern. His question still stands today, and every plan for redistribution has to face it: by what right do you take from a person what others have freely given him?
Further reading
- Robert Nozick: Anarchie, Staat, Utopia, translated by Hermann Vetter, Olzog, Munich 2011 (in German)
- Robert Nozick: Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Basic Books, New York 1974
- Murray N. Rothbard: “Robert Nozick and the Immaculate Conception of the State,” in Journal of Libertarian Studies 1 (1), 1977
- Ralf M. Bader and John Meadowcroft (eds.): The Cambridge Companion to Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2011
This article is part of our series on thinkers, doers, and historical figures of liberty.
Sources
- Nozick, Robert: Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Basic Books, New York 1974; German edition: Anarchie, Staat, Utopia, translated by Hermann Vetter, Moderne Verlags-Gesellschaft, Munich c. 1976; new editions Olzog, Munich 2006 and 2011.
- Nozick, Robert: Philosophical Explanations, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1981.
- Nozick, Robert: “Who Would Choose Socialism?,” essay, 1978 (quoted in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).
- Nozick, Robert: The Examined Life. Philosophical Meditations, Simon & Schuster, New York 1989.
- Nozick, Robert: The Nature of Rationality, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1993.
- Nozick, Robert: Invariances. The Structure of the Objective World, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2001.
- Sanchez, Julian: interview with Robert Nozick, July 2001 (quoted in Mises Wiki and Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Robert Nozick’s Political Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nozick-political/
- Harvard Gazette: Philosopher Robert Nozick dies at 63, January 2002, https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2002/01/philosopher-nozick-dies-at-63/
- Columbia College Today: obituary “Robert Nozick ’59,” May 2002, https://www.college.columbia.edu/cct_archive/may02/may02_obituaries1.html
- Gordon, David: Rothbard and Nozick, Mises Wire, January 7, 2017, https://mises.org/wire/rothbard-and-nozick
- Rothbard, Murray N.: Robert Nozick and the Immaculate Conception of the State, in Journal of Libertarian Studies 1 (1), 1977, pp. 45–57, https://mises.org/journal-libertarian-studies/robert-nozick-and-immaculate-conception-state
- Bader, Ralf M.; Meadowcroft, John (eds.): The Cambridge Companion to Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2011.
- Schmidtz, David (ed.): Robert Nozick, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002.
- Mises Wiki: Robert Nozick, https://wiki.mises.org/wiki/Robert_Nozick.html
- Wikipedia (en): Robert Nozick, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Nozick (biography, overview)
Featured image: Robert Nozick (AI illustration)

