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“The State Is All of Us.” Really?

“The state is all of us” is one of the most powerful phrases in political rhetoric, because at first glance it sounds self-evident and only falls apart on closer inspection. This article clarifies what the state actually is in terms of political theory, namely not a collective subject but an apparatus holding the monopoly on legitimate force, and uses the problem of democratic representation to show why equating citizen and state holds up neither in theory nor in practice. The example of Germany’s publicly funded consumer advice centers (Verbraucherzentralen) and their treatment of traditional natural products such as rockrose tea, jiaogulan, and stevia also shows how state preferences are enforced through formally independent organizations without anyone being held concretely accountable. The article acknowledges the legitimate concern behind the slogan before explaining why democratic legitimacy alone cannot establish an identity between the people and the state apparatus.

“The state is all of us.” Anyone who uses this phrase is either naive or uninformed.

The phrase comes up almost every time someone criticizes the state: the tax burden, a new regulation, a questionable subsidy, or simply the fact that an agency has once again decided what citizens must or must not do. Then, reliably, someone steps in to remind us that you cannot complain about yourself, since after all we are all the state. Anyone who is allowed to vote, so the logic goes, shares responsibility for what happens afterward, and anyone who shares responsibility can hardly pose as the victim of an alien power. The phrase thus works not as a description but as a rhetorical gag order, because it is meant to nip criticism in the bud by dissolving the distinction between rulers and ruled at the level of language, before that distinction can be examined on its merits.

What the state really is

To test whether this dissolution is justified, one must first clarify what we are actually talking about. The classic definition in political theory comes from Max Weber, who in his 1919 lecture “Politics as a Vocation” described the state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”1 What is decisive about this definition is that it defines the state not by a group of people but by a means, namely the monopoly on force. Those who actually exercise this monopoly are concrete persons with names, official titles, and interests of their own: ministers, members of parliament, judges, police officers, tax officials, and thousands of clerks in subordinate agencies. These persons are not identical with the citizenry as a whole, just as a company’s board is not identical with its customers, even if the company is formally supposed to act in the customers’ interest. Soberly considered, then, the state is an apparatus that commands people and makes decisions, and not some mystical assembly of all citizens that somehow acts collectively.

The problem of representation

One might object that this apparatus is, after all, democratically legitimated, because the people elect their representatives and the apparatus therefore does follow the will of all. This is where the real problem begins. Between an election every four or five years and the daily flood of concrete decisions a modern state makes lies a gap that no ballot can close. Whoever votes for a party is not voting on individual laws, ordinances, or administrative acts, but on a vague bundle of promises that, after the election, dissolves into coalition agreements, party discipline, and administrative practice. Public choice theory, founded by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, has described this mechanism with economic precision: politicians and officials do not act as selfless executors of some common good, however defined, but, like all market participants, as actors with their own interests, career goals, and reelection motives.2 Added to this is the so-called problem of rational ignorance: since a single vote among millions of eligible voters has practically no influence on the outcome, it makes little economic sense for the individual citizen to study every policy area in detail, while organized interest groups with concentrated prospects of gain do exactly that and accordingly gain disproportionate influence. Anyone who claims that “we all” decided on a particular tax increase or regulation thus glosses over both the structural distance between the act of voting and the individual decision and the fact that every majority decision is, by definition, imposed against the will of a minority that also belongs to the “all” in whose name the slogan claims to speak.

Outsourced power: when the state makes its preferences disappear

The fiction becomes even clearer when one looks at how modern states enforce their substantive preferences without having to answer for them directly. Much of what the state does not want to prohibit or order directly, because that would be politically unpopular or legally vulnerable, it leaves to formally independent organizations that it at the same time funds substantially. An instructive example is Germany’s consumer advice centers. The consumer advice center of North Rhine-Westphalia alone had a budget of around 56.09 million euros in 2025, which according to its own account comes mainly from institutional funding by the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, supplemented by funds from cities and districts as well as project grants.3 A predominantly state-funded organization that at the same time presents itself as a neutral, independent body serving consumers is structurally exactly what one may call a parallel institution, because it allows the state to steer behavior without any democratically elected body being held responsible for it by name.

What this looks like in practice is shown by the treatment of traditional natural products that fall under the European Novel Food Regulation.4 This regulation declares any food a “novel food” if it was not consumed to a significant degree in the European Union before May 15, 1997, and requires a costly authorization procedure before it may be legally sold as food. Rockrose tea, used as a home remedy in the Mediterranean for centuries, falls squarely into this category. The consumer advice center points out on its own website that only a single trademarked variety, Cistus incanus L. Pandalis, holds a valid novel food authorization, limited to three grams of herb per day, while all other rockrose teas remain in a legal gray area in which, according to the consumer advice center itself, even the responsible authorities of the German states disagree.5 On this basis, the Federation of German Consumer Organisations (vzbv) has sent formal cease-and-desist letters to retailers that made health claims about rockrose tea, for example to a tea shop that was sued in 2021 over advertising claims about antiviral effects.6 The case of jiaogulan, a plant used in China for centuries, is similarly unclear: while a 2012 court ruling prohibited its sale as food, the German Federal Institute for Risk Assessment (BfR) found in 2019 that, owing to documented traditional use before 1997, it did not qualify as a novel food at all, a contradiction that has not been bindingly resolved to this day.7 The case of stevia is particularly revealing: the highly purified, industrially produced extract from stevia leaves was approved as the additive E 960 in November 2011 after a dispute over its approval lasting more than twenty years, while the whole, unprocessed stevia leaf, used for sweetening in South America for centuries, is still not approved as food.8 Of all things, it is the patentable, elaborately processed industrial form that passes the procedure, while the traditional form, which anyone can reproduce in a home garden, remains blocked.

None of these cases requires assuming a conspiracy, because the pattern arises purely from the structure. An arbitrarily chosen cutoff date decides between permission and prohibition; the authorization procedure is expensive and bureaucratically burdensome, which structurally favors large, well-capitalized companies over decentralized small suppliers and traditional experiential knowledge; and a predominantly state-funded consumer advice center then ensures that consumers, wary of cease-and-desist letters, prefer to reach for the approved alternatives. The end result is a steering effect that no democratically elected parliament ever decided on and for which, consequently, no one who stands for election can be held to account. This is precisely the parallel institution mentioned earlier: power outsourced to where responsibility can no longer be assigned.

What is legitimate about the slogan

So that the critique does not slide into a cheap caricature, the opposing position deserves a fair hearing. A republic does in fact differ fundamentally from a monarchy or aristocracy, in which rule is hereditary or ordained by God. Every citizen is in principle free to vote, run for office, organize, and criticize publicly, and this formal openness of political access is historically far from a matter of course; it is a genuine achievement of civilization. Rousseau’s idea of a volonté générale, a general will that differs from the mere sum of individual interests, attempts to capture precisely this thought philosophically, namely that a democratically constituted community does, in a certain sense, govern itself. Whoever ignores this achievement and equates democracy wholesale with tyranny makes things just as easy for himself as the person who chokes off every criticism by pointing out that the state is, after all, “all of us.”

Why the equation fails anyway

Yet it is precisely here that the limit of the argument becomes visible, and in Rousseau himself. His most famous and at the same time most problematic theorem holds that whoever refuses to obey the general will may be compelled to do so by the whole body, which, in Rousseau’s words, means that he will be “forced to be free.” Thus it is precisely the thinker who thought democratic self-rule through most consistently who supplies the theoretical template for reinterpreting individual resistance to majority decisions as betrayal of one’s own, supposedly true will. Formal sovereignty of the people and actual control over concrete decisions therefore come apart at exactly the moment the majority begins to pass off its will as the will of all. Public choice theory supplies the empirical foundation for this: because the benefits of state action are usually concentrated on small, well-organized groups while the costs are spread broadly across everyone else, those who least speak for “all” systematically prevail, even though decisions are formally made in the name of all.

Conclusion: the slogan as a moral cleansing agent

This is where the real danger of the phrase “The state is all of us” lies. It is not merely an inaccurate description but a moral cleansing agent. If the state really were identical with the citizenry as a whole, no one could ever, in the proper sense, suffer an injustice at its hands, for taxes would then be merely money that society transfers to itself, regulation mere self-discipline, and every overreach by the state ultimately nothing but collective self-harm for which no one can be held individually responsible. It is precisely this blurring of individual responsibility that Frédéric Bastiat had in view in 1848 when he described the state as the great fiction through which everyone tries to live at the expense of everyone else.9 Friedrich August von Hayek, too, warned how much collectivist language, the ever-available “we,” renders individual decisions and individual responsibility invisible by pretending there is a unified will of the people where in truth competing plans, interests, and values collide.10

Liberty therefore does not begin with the claim that the state is merely oneself anyway, but with the sober refusal to accept this comfortable fiction. It begins with holding the concrete people who actually exercise the monopoly on force accountable, by name and through institutions, instead of letting them vanish behind a grammatical plural for which no one has to answer personally anymore. Whoever uncritically adopts the phrase “The state is all of us” gives up precisely this distinction and with it the basis of any serious criticism of state power.

Notes

  1. Max Weber: Politics as a Vocation (Politik als Beruf). Lecture, Munich 1919.
  2. James M. Buchanan / Gordon Tullock: The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor 1962.
  3. Verbraucherzentrale NRW: Finanzierung der Verbraucherzentrale NRW (in German). https://www.verbraucherzentrale.nrw/ueberuns-nrw/finanzierung-nrw (as of 2025).
  4. Regulation (EU) 2015/2283 of the European Parliament and of the Council of November 25, 2015 on novel foods.
  5. Verbraucherzentrale.de: Zistrose (in German). https://www.verbraucherzentrale.de/wissen/lebensmittel/nahrungsergaenzungsmittel/zistrose-48529
  6. Lebensmittelklarheit.de (vzbv): Teehaus muss übertriebene Werbung für Zistrose einstellen (in German). https://www.lebensmittelklarheit.de/produktmeldungen/teehaus-muss-uebertriebene-werbung-fuer-zistrose-einstellen
  7. German Federal Institute for Risk Assessment (2019), quoted in: Jiaogulan Verbot? Rechtslage Deutschland, EU Novel Food Status (in German). https://www.bioherby.com/jiaogulan/rechtliches/verbot/
  8. Commission Regulation (EU) No 1131/2011 of November 11, 2011; see also transgen.de: Steviol-Glykoside E960 (in German). https://www.transgen.de/datenbank/zusatzstoffe/2210.steviolglycoside-e960.html
  9. Frédéric Bastiat: L’État (The State). In: Journal des débats, September 25, 1848.
  10. Friedrich August von Hayek: The Road to Serfdom. London 1944.

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