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Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: A Commerce of Light in the Service of Princes

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

When Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was buried in Hanover in November 1716, no clergyman, no minister, and no representative of the court followed the coffin. Only his secretary Johann Georg Eckhart paid him his last respects, and a Scottish contemporary wrote that he had been buried more like a highwayman than like the ornament of his century. The Berlin Society of Sciences, whose first president he had been, stayed silent, and only the Paris Academy had a eulogy delivered.

Yet this man left behind a correspondence that is now part of UNESCO’s Memory of the World: some 20,000 letters with about 1,300 correspondents, from Jesuits in Beijing to mathematicians in London. His salaries, however, came from princes all his life, and his idea of a good commonwealth clearly bears their mark.

At a glance

  • Life: July 1, 1646, in Leipzig to November 14, 1716, in Hanover
  • Work: jurist and diplomat in Mainz, court councillor and librarian of the House of Brunswick-Lüneburg in Hanover from 1676, first president of the Berlin Society of Sciences from 1700, Imperial Aulic Councillor in Vienna and Russian Privy Councillor of Justice from 1712
  • Major works: Nova methodus pro maximis et minimis (1684), Discours de métaphysique (1686), Novissima Sinica (1697), Nouveaux essais (1704, printed 1765), Essais de Théodicée (1710), Monadologie (1714)
  • In one sentence: A scholar who wanted to share knowledge without limits and entrusted the common good to princes.

A Son of Leipzig at Foreign Courts

Leibniz was born two years before the end of the Thirty Years’ War. His father, a professor of moral philosophy in Leipzig, died when the boy was six. When the Leipzig law faculty postponed his doctorate in 1666 in favor of older candidates, he left the city for good, and in November of the same year he received his doctorate in both civil and canon law in Altdorf near Nuremberg.

An academic career held little appeal for him. Through the diplomat Johann Christian von Boineburg he came to the court of the Elector of Mainz, who sent him to Paris on a diplomatic mission in 1672. He stayed there for four years, met scholars such as Antoine Arnauld and Christiaan Huygens, immersed himself in mathematics, and in 1673 demonstrated a calculating machine in London, whereupon the Royal Society elected him a member. From 1676 on he served three dukes and electors in Hanover as librarian, court councillor, and court historian. A project to drain the silver mines of the Harz Mountains with wind power failed in the mid-1680s, and the history of the House of Guelph that he had been commissioned to write remained unfinished. When his employer Georg Ludwig became King of Great Britain in 1714, Leibniz had to stay behind in Hanover.

A Sign for the Infinite

In Paris Leibniz developed the infinitesimal calculus. In November 1675 he used the integral sign for the first time, and in 1684 he published the differential calculus in the Leipzig journal Acta Eruditorum. Isaac Newton had been first with the substance, Leibniz first in print, and most scholars today agree that the two worked independently of each other. The priority dispute was nonetheless fought bitterly: the report with which the Royal Society ruled against Leibniz in 1713 had been written by Newton himself.

He had also worked out the binary system of zeros and ones, with which today’s computers calculate, as early as around 1679. He published it only in the proceedings of the Paris Academy for 1703, after an exchange of letters with the Jesuit Joachim Bouvet in Beijing, who believed he could see in the signs of the Chinese I Ching a counterpart to the binary numbers.

According to Leibniz, the world consists of monads, simple substances which, according to §7 of the Monadology, have “no windows” through which anything could enter or leave. That their states nevertheless fit together is owed to a harmony set up in advance by God, that is, a preestablished harmony. In the Theodicy of 1710 he defended the thesis that God had created the best of all possible worlds, which Voltaire mocked in Candide in 1759.

A Commerce of Light

For decades Leibniz pursued the plan of a learned society in Germany that would combine science with practical use, as expressed in the motto “Theoria cum praxi.” In Berlin he succeeded: on July 11, 1700, Elector Frederick III signed the founding charter of the Brandenburg Society of Sciences, whose constitution Leibniz had drafted, and appointed him its president. Today’s Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities grew out of it. He presented similar plans in Dresden, in Vienna, and to Peter the Great, whose Saint Petersburg Academy, however, came into being only in 1725.

His curiosity about China shows his widest horizon. In 1697 he published reports by Jesuit missionaries under the title Novissima Sinica and in the preface praised the practical morality and statecraft of the Chinese. In substance he wrote there that Europe almost needed Chinese missionaries to teach it natural theology, just as Europe sent the Chinese teachers of revealed religion. In a letter to the Jesuit Antoine Verjus in 1697, he called the exchange between the two cultures, in substance, a commerce of light.

Toleration Across Confessional Lines

Leibniz was a Lutheran, but for decades he worked toward a reunion of the separated churches, beginning in Mainz with the Demonstrationes catholicae. The philosopher Maria Rosa Antognazza argues that this project included a doctrine of toleration that she calls robust, multilayered, and unusually inclusive. On this reading, where agreement cannot be reached even on the most important doctrines, dissent is to be accepted. According to Antognazza in an interview, Leibniz drew the line only where a conviction entails violence against the state. Other scholars, however, regard toleration in his thought as a mere instrument of church politics.

Added to this is a text on the common concept of justice from around 1703. In it, according to the interpretation of the philosopher Julia Jorati, Leibniz rejects the Aristotelian doctrine of the “slave by nature” and argues against the ownership of human beings: slavery violates natural rights, equity and piety set narrow limits on what is permitted, and it could be justified at most in the case of a person permanently incapable of governing himself, which hardly applies to any real human being. The argument remains theoretical, however, and, according to Jorati, makes no recognizable reference to the slave trade of his time.

Justice as the Charity of the Wise

Leibniz summarized his philosophy of law in 1693 in the preface to a collection of documents of international law. Justice, he wrote, is the charity of the wise, caritas sapientis, and it has three levels, which he took from the precepts of law of Justinian. The lowest is strict right, with the command to harm no one, and it serves to preserve peace. Above it stands equity, which gives each his own and also demands gratitude and beneficence, duties, that is, which no court can enforce. The highest level is piety, which demands an honorable life.

Against Thomas Hobbes and Samuel Pufendorf, Leibniz insisted that law does not follow from mere will, neither that of a ruler nor that of God. In his opinion on Pufendorf’s principles of 1706 he wrote that neither the norm of conduct nor the essence of the just depends on a free decision, but on rules of equality and proportion grounded in the immutable nature of things.

The Common Good as a Matter for the Courts

The same doctrine of law has a flip side. If equity demands that we promote the happiness of others, it is tempting to assign this task to those who have the means, that is, to the princes. Leibniz did so in a long series of memoranda for his employers.

The clearest example is his memorandum on Öffentliche Assecuranzen (public insurance) of 1680. In it he proposes a state fund against damage from fire and storms, into which every subject is to pay according to his means, and he justifies it by the interest of the ruler: the “prosperity of a country” consists chiefly “in the number of its people,” and only a ruler with productive subjects can levy taxes and defend his country. The authorities, as with the convoys in Holland and Hamburg, should act as “asseureur general,” and he wanted to use the accumulated capital to pay for projects of princely economic development. Yet the Hamburg fire insurance fund, the Hamburger Feuerkasse, which served him as a model, had initially been founded by private citizens with the consent of the authorities. Added to this were proposals for annual reports on illness by physicians, for state tables to give the ruler an overview, and for silk cultivation. This is the world of cameralism, the doctrine of princely administration that treated the welfare of subjects and the strength of the state as one and the same task.

The Berlin Society, too, rested on a privilege. Leibniz secured for it the exclusive right to produce and sell calendars in Brandenburg-Prussia, because it was not supposed to cost the Elector anything. Since the revenue could be secured only with a state guarantee, this resulted, as the Academy itself writes today, in “considerable opportunities for state and royal intervention.”

Then there is service to princes in the narrower sense. In 1672 Leibniz traveled to Paris to win Louis XIV over to a campaign in Egypt that was meant to divert France’s arms from Holland and the Holy Roman Empire, and he also justified it as a holy war. The king never received him. In 1677 he wrote, under a pseudonym, a treatise intended to secure diplomatic sovereignty for the princes of Brunswick-Lüneburg. In letters to Landgrave Ernst of Hesse-Rheinfels he considered a right to resist a ruler usually unjustified and almost always unwise. He served Hanover, Berlin, Vienna, and the tsar, in part at the same time, and sought to realize every great project through a court.

In the context of his time this was nothing unusual. A scholar without means could hardly live otherwise, and his memoranda at least bound princely power to the duty of serving the welfare of the subjects. From the standpoint of liberty, however, it must be noted that he conceived of society as an institution that a wise authority administers for the happiness of its members, and that he developed no theory of his own for the self-ordering of free people.

What Friends of Liberty Can Learn from Him

Leibniz is most compelling as an example of the value of free exchange. His network of letters knew no boundaries of confession, nation, or continent, and he was convinced that Europeans could learn from the Chinese just as much as the other way around.

His doctrine of law against arbitrariness also remains important. For him, law is grounded in the nature of things and not in command, and the first duty is to harm no one. This connects him with the natural law tradition on which classical liberalism also rests, even though Leibniz himself drew different political conclusions. Added to this, if one follows Antognazza and Jorati, are a broadly conceived toleration of those of other faiths and an argument against the ownership of human beings, neither of which could be taken for granted in a courtier of the late seventeenth century.

Light Without Windows

Leibniz made much possible that later generations used in freedom: a mathematics on which modern technology is built, academies in which scholars of different countries and creeds worked together, and a habit of exchange across all borders. He did not take the step of understanding the commonwealth, too, as the result of the free action of many. His harmony came from God, and his common good was to come from the courts, which in the end left him alone.

What lasted, by contrast, was what he had built without any commission from a prince: a network of correspondents that no one had ordered and that nonetheless brought order to the knowledge of his time. Whether one might not see in it the better model for the common good is a question that Leibniz himself did not ask in this form, yet one that presses itself on anyone reading his letters.

Further reading

  • Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Political Writings, ed. and trans. by Patrick Riley, Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed., Cambridge 1988
  • Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Writings on China, ed. by Daniel J. Cook and Henry Rosemont Jr., Open Court, Chicago 1994
  • Maria Rosa Antognazza: Leibniz. An Intellectual Biography, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009

This article is part of our series on thinkers, doers, and historical figures of liberty.

Sources

  • Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: Nova methodus pro maximis et minimis, in: Acta Eruditorum, Leipzig 1684.
  • Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: Codex Iuris Gentium Diplomaticus, Hanover 1693 (preface: justice as caritas sapientis).
  • Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: Novissima Sinica, 1697; in: Writings on China, ed. by Daniel J. Cook and Henry Rosemont Jr., Open Court, Chicago 1994.
  • Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: Explication de l’arithmétique binaire, in: Mémoires de l’Académie royale des sciences, volume for 1703.
  • Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: Essais de Théodicée, Amsterdam 1710.
  • Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: Monadologie (1714), §7.
  • Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: Öffentliche Assecuranzen (1680), in: Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, Academy edition, series IV, vol. 3, Berlin 1986, pp. 421–432 (in German).
  • Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: Political Writings, ed. and trans. by Patrick Riley, Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed., Cambridge 1988 (including Codex Iuris Gentium, opinion on Pufendorf 1706, Meditation on the Common Concept of Justice, Caesarinus Fürstenerius 1677, letters to Landgrave Ernst of Hesse-Rheinfels).
  • Look, Brandon C.: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz/
  • Leibniz’s Ethics, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-ethics/
  • Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, in: Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, vol. 18, Leipzig 1883, https://de.wikisource.org/wiki/ADB:Leibniz,_Gottfried_Wilhelm (in German)
  • O’Connor, J. J.; Robertson, E. F.: Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, MacTutor History of Mathematics, University of St Andrews, https://mathshistory.st-andrews.ac.uk/Biographies/Leibniz/
  • Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften: Historische Broschüre, 2020 edition (sections “Leibniz und der Beginn der Berliner Sozietät,” “Das Kalenderprivileg”), https://www.bbaw.de/files-bbaw/user_upload/publikationen/BBAW_Hist_Broschuere_Auflage_2020_online.pdf (in German)
  • Zwierlein, Cornel: Leibniz und das Versicherungsdenken, in: Mitteilungen des SFB 573, LMU München, 1/2008, https://www.sfb-frueheneuzeit.uni-muenchen.de/mitteilungen/M1-2008/analogien.pdf (in German)
  • Antognazza, Maria Rosa: Leibniz’s Doctrine of Toleration: Philosophical, Theological and Pragmatic Reasons, in: Natural Law and Toleration in the Early Enlightenment, Oxford University Press 2013, pp. 139–164, https://philarchive.org/rec/ANTLDO
  • Antognazza, Maria Rosa: Leibniz. An Intellectual Biography, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009.
  • Jorati, Julia: Leibniz on Slavery and the Ownership of Human Beings, in: Journal of Modern Philosophy 1 (2019), https://jmphil.org/article/id/2132/
  • Horst, Ulrich: Leibniz und der Harzbergbau, in: Der Anschnitt 5/1966, https://www.bergbaumuseum.de/fileadmin/forschung/zeitschriften/der-anschnitt/1966/1966-05/anschnitt-5-1966-horst-leibniz.pdf (in German)
  • Strickland, Lloyd: How sincere was Leibniz’s religious justification for war in the Justa Dissertatio?, https://philarchive.org/archive/STRHSW
  • Landeshauptstadt Hannover: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Bibliothek (correspondence, UNESCO Memory of the World 2007), https://www.hannover.de/Wirtschaft-Wissenschaft/Wissenschaft/Initiative-Wissenschaft-Hannover/Leibniz-in-Hannover/Leibniz’-Nachlass/Gottfried-Wilhelm-Leibniz-Bibliothek (in German)
  • Leibniz–Bouvet correspondence, Swarthmore College, https://leibniz-bouvet.swarthmore.edu
  • De Cruz, Helen: Leibniz on public health, https://helendecruz.substack.com/p/leibniz-on-public-health-or-the-values

Featured image: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (AI illustration)

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