Summary: Anyone who calls libertarians “hostile to the state” is confusing criticism of the state with hostility toward it. This article shows that skepticism toward state power is one of the oldest and most venerable traditions of political thought, deeply rooted in the liberal heritage of the Enlightenment and even anchored in Germany’s Basic Law, its constitution. We also look at the serious internal debate between minarchists and anarcho-capitalists and show why rejecting the party state (Parteienstaat, a political system dominated by the established parties) is a legitimate and legally protected opinion.
An Accusation That Refutes Itself
“You are hostile to the state.” Libertarians hear this sentence with remarkable regularity. It sounds like a serious charge, like a danger to democracy, like political incompetence. But it contains a strange contradiction: whoever says it implicitly claims that the state must be protected from criticism, that it needs protection more than the citizen does. That is precisely the authoritarian logic liberalism has fought for centuries.
To be clear: criticism of the state is not a fringe phenomenon of radical outsiders. It is the heart of Enlightenment political philosophy. Anyone familiar with Locke, Montesquieu, Kant, or American constitutional thought knows that the question “Who watches the watchmen?” is not hostile to the state but essential to it.
What the Enlightenment Taught: Power Requires Distrust
In the 17th century, John Locke formulated the basic idea that precedes all liberal thought: the state is not a natural being with its own right to exist, but an instrument that people created to secure their pre-political rights to life, liberty, and property. As soon as it violates these rights, it loses its legitimacy. Locke’s “Two Treatises of Government” (1689) is not an anarchist pamphlet but the foundation of the modern constitutional state.
Montesquieu, the French Enlightenment thinker, drew the institutional consequence: power must be checked by power. His principle of the separation of powers, with the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary kept apart and checking one another, is not an idea of state skeptics on the fringe but the design principle of every liberal democracy. Montesquieu distrusted power not because he hated the state but because he knew history.
Immanuel Kant linked this idea to the concept of maturity: the enlightened citizen does not submit in blind obedience but examines whether the actions of the state are compatible with the universal law of reason. For Kant, criticism is not rebellion but a duty.
“Sapere aude! Have the courage to use your own understanding.”
Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?” 1784
Anyone who calls libertarian skepticism of the state “hostile” unintentionally declares Locke, Montesquieu, and Kant enemies of the state. That is a strange position for someone who invokes the democratic tradition.
The Basic Law as a Shield: Skepticism as a Constitutional Principle
There is no need to dig into the history of philosophy. It is enough to open Germany’s Basic Law (Grundgesetz).
The basic rights in Articles 1 to 19 of the Basic Law are not rights that the state graciously grants the citizen. They are defensive rights against the state. That is not a libertarian interpretation; it is the standard definition in every textbook of German constitutional law. Article 1(3) makes clear that the basic rights “bind the legislature, the executive and the judiciary as directly applicable law.” The citizen needs protection from the state, not the other way around.
Article 20(4) of the Basic Law goes even further: it grants all Germans the right to resist anyone who attempts to abolish the constitutional order, if no other remedy is available. The Basic Law, expressly conceived as a response to the abuse of state power under National Socialism, anchors institutional distrust of the state as a constitutional principle.
So anyone who calls libertarian skepticism of the state anti-constitutional finds himself in a peculiar contradiction with the constitution itself.
Criticizing the State Is Not Destroying It
A distinction is worth making here, one that is often deliberately blurred in the debate.
Criticism of the state means: we question whether state action is justified, whether it is efficient, whether it restricts the liberty of citizens disproportionately. We ask whether certain tasks could be better performed in a decentralized way, privately, or by institutions of civil society. These questions are legitimate. They are asked not only by libertarians but by economists, sociologists, legal scholars, and historians of every political stripe.
Hostility to the state would mean: we reject every form of political order, we want the physical destruction of state structures, or we advocate lawlessness. That is not the libertarian position, at least not that of the mainstream. Hayek argued for the rule of law and against arbitrary rule. Mises defended law and contract as the foundation of the market. Even Murray Rothbard, the most radical of the great libertarian thinkers, developed an elaborate system of property rights and contract law, that is, a normative order, not anomie.
The charge of “hostility to the state” thrives on this confusion. It treats every criticism of the scope of the state as if it aimed at abolishing it, and every demand to limit state power as if it meant chaos.
The Historical Tradition: Libertarians Are in Good Company
It is worth naming the lineage of skepticism toward the state, because it is anything but “far-right.”
Frédéric Bastiat, the 19th-century French economist, described the state as “the great fictitious entity by which everyone seeks to live at the expense of everyone else.” His writings are brilliant defenses of free exchange against protectionism and subsidy policy.
Henry David Thoreau, an American Transcendentalist writer and committed individualist, refused to pay taxes he considered immoral and wrote “Resistance to Civil Government” (1849), a text that later influenced Martin Luther King Jr. and Mahatma Gandhi. Hostile to the state? Or the conscience of democracy?
Herbert Spencer, the 19th-century English philosopher and social theorist, developed in “The Man versus the State” (1884) one of the most consistent defenses of individualism against the expanding state. Spencer saw with clarity how even well-intentioned state interventions systematically erode liberty, and he predicted the development of the welfare state long before it arrived. Hostile to the state? He was simply a careful observer.
Alexis de Tocqueville, a conservative liberal and admirer of American democracy, saw with clarity that democracies could tend toward a soft despotism, a paternalistic state that administers its citizens like a flock of lambs, without oppressing them, but also without setting them free.
These thinkers are not marginal figures. They belong to the core of modern political thought. Anyone who brands their successors as “hostile to the state” is not engaged in political analysis but in labeling.
Satire, Press, Public Broadcasting: Criticizing the State as a Constitutional Mandate
It is remarkable that the very institutions that see themselves as guardians of democracy have traditionally lived off the right to criticize the state, to caricature it, and to expose it.
The freedom of the press under Article 5 of the Basic Law is not a freedom to flatter citizens. It is the freedom to hold the powerful to account. The task of journalism, as described in newsroom charters and press laws, is to be the “Fourth Estate,” the critical corrective to the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary.
Germany’s public broadcasters are obliged by interstate treaty to report independently and at a distance from the state. At a distance from the state: that means not being subservient to the state but keeping a critical distance. Satire shows such as the German program “Satiregipfel” or political magazine programs depend on being allowed to ridicule politicians, pick laws apart, and call government decisions wrong.
All of this is criticism of the state. Does anyone call it “hostile to the state”? Of course not. So why do the same questions suddenly count as dangerous when libertarians ask them?
A Movement That Questions Itself: The Internal Debate
Intellectual honesty requires naming the debates within the libertarian camp openly as well, because they show that this is not a blind ideology but serious political thought.
Among libertarians, the question of how much state structure can be legitimate is seriously contested. Minarchists, that is, supporters of the minimal state, consider certain core tasks indispensable: creating and enforcing law, and protecting against crime at home and aggression from abroad. Nothing more is needed, they say, and anything more is dangerous. Anarcho-capitalists, by contrast, led by Murray Rothbard, argue that even these core functions could be performed better by voluntary, market-based arrangements than by a state monopoly. Both positions deserve to be taken seriously philosophically, and both contend with each other, without this article wanting or being able to give a final answer.
What is certain, however: even if people disagree about the scope of legitimate collective organization, that does not mean chaos or lawlessness. On the contrary, libertarian thinkers have studied more intensively than most others how law, property, and voluntary cooperation can work without coercion.
And one more thing deserves explicit mention: anyone who rejects the party state, with its career politicians, its patronage structures, and its tendency toward self-perpetuation, holds a legitimate, legal position protected by freedom of expression. This criticism has a long tradition, from Robert Michels’ “iron law of oligarchy” through commentators such as Ralf Dahrendorf to contemporary theorists of democracy. It is not an attack on democracy but a call to deepen it.
Enlightenment Versus Tribalism: The Real Conflict
Behind the charge of “hostility to the state” lies a deeper conflict that is rarely named openly. It is the conflict between two fundamentally different attitudes toward the world: enlightened individualism on one side and a modern tribalism on the other.
Over decades, the state has developed and entrenched a doctrine: through schools, public broadcasting, political language, and the sheer omnipresence of state institutions. Many people simply believe that existing conditions are natural, necessary, and without alternative. Not because they have examined this, but because no one has ever shown them otherwise. This is not a malicious conspiracy; it is what institutions do: they reproduce themselves by limiting the imagination.
This is exactly where the Enlightenment comes in. Kant’s call for maturity was not an abstract doctrine of virtue but a direct attack on this conditioning. Whoever uses his own understanding, whoever asks why something is the way it is and not otherwise, whoever asks authorities for their reasons instead of their titles, is practicing enlightenment. Libertarians see themselves in this tradition: as successors of those thinkers who did not accept the king, the church, and the state as God-given, but as human constructs that must be justified, limited, and if necessary rejected.
The counterimage is the collective, the tribe. The tribe defines belonging through submission to shared rites, symbols, and taboos. Whoever does not perform the rites, whoever questions the symbols, whoever breaks the taboos, is cast out. In premodern societies these were religious ceremonies and blood ties. In modern welfare states they are professions of faith in the right party, the right redistribution policy, the right degree of state care. Whoever deviates gets a label: “far-right,” “Social Darwinist,” “hostile to the state.”
The function of these labels is the same as the function of the tribal ban: not argument, but exclusion. There is no need to refute the libertarian position; one only has to place the person who holds it outside the community of acceptable opinion. This is the mechanism Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann described as the “spiral of silence”: whoever believes he is alone with his opinion falls silent. Whoever falls silent confirms to everyone else that no one else thinks that way.
The difference between the enlightened individualist and the member of the tribe, then, does not lie in coldness or selfishness, as the accusation often goes. It lies in the willingness to ask uncomfortable questions, even when the tribe does not like to hear them. That is not hostility toward society. It is the precondition for societies being able to change at all.
Conclusion: Criticism Is Not Hostility
The charge of “hostility to the state” works only if one accepts a simple equation: whoever does not love the state is fighting it. This equation is false. It is the opposite of liberal thought.
Liberalism does not mean hating the state. It means taking it seriously: as an instrument that can be useful and can become dangerous, that must be controlled, limited, and bound by rules. The demand for control is not hostility; it is respect for the real possibilities of abuse of power, for which history provides ample evidence.
The Basic Law, Enlightenment philosophy, the liberal tradition from Locke through Tocqueville to Hayek: they all stand on this side. Whoever calls that “hostile to the state” declares the entire constitutional history of the West a danger to democracy. That is a strange way to defend democracy.
Further Reading
- John Locke: Two Treatises of Government (1689)
- Montesquieu: De l’esprit des lois (1748; in English: The Spirit of the Laws)
- Immanuel Kant: Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? (1784; in English: An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?)
- Alexis de Tocqueville: De la démocratie en Amérique (1835/1840; in English: Democracy in America)
- Herbert Spencer: The Man versus the State (1884)
- Frédéric Bastiat: La Loi (1850; in English: The Law)
- Friedrich A. Hayek: The Constitution of Liberty (1960)
- Ludwig von Mises: Liberalismus (1927; in English: Liberalism)

