Skip to content Skip to footer

Max Stirner: The Unique One Against the State

In November 1844, a book from the Leipzig publishing house of Otto Wigand appeared in the bookshops, its title page already bearing the year 1845. Its author called himself Max Stirner; in everyday life he was Johann Caspar Schmidt, a teacher at a private school in Berlin for girls from well-to-do families. The book was called Der Einzige und sein Eigentum (known in English as The Ego and His Own), and it was banned in many German states.

Anyone who reads it today with an eye for liberty finds sentences that every critic of the state would gladly sign. Every state is a despotism, Stirner writes, the republic included. A few pages later, however, one learns that for him the neighbor’s right to property is also nothing but a spook, and that whatever he is able to take belongs to him. Stirner is therefore an ally with reservations: a sharp diagnostician of power who at the same time rejects every foundation on which an order of free people could be built.

At a glance

  • Life: October 25, 1806, in Bayreuth, to June 25, 1856, in Berlin
  • Real name: Johann Caspar Schmidt; “Stirner” was a nickname inspired by his high forehead (Stirn in German)
  • Work: teacher at a girls’ school in Berlin (1839 to 1844), member of the Young Hegelian circle known as “the Free Ones” (die Freien), translator of Jean-Baptiste Say and Adam Smith
  • Major work: Der Einzige und sein Eigentum (Leipzig 1844, dated 1845)
  • In one sentence: He exposed the state, morality and humanity as ideas to which the individual is sacrificed, and with the same consistency declared law and property to be nothing but power.

A Teacher Among the Free Ones

From 1826 Schmidt studied philology and Protestant theology in Berlin, where his teachers included Schleiermacher and Hegel, with additional semesters in Erlangen and Königsberg. A career in the civil service was closed to him, and so from 1839 to 1844 he taught at a private girls’ school. From 1841 he frequented “the Free Ones,” a Left Hegelian debating circle around Bruno Bauer that met in Hippel’s wine bar.

This milieu produced his only major book, dedicated to his second wife, Marie Dähnhardt. It was printed in a thousand copies and drew replies from Bauer, Ludwig Feuerbach, Moses Hess and Arnold Ruge. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels devoted more than three hundred printed pages to Stirner in their Deutsche Ideologie (The German Ideology), although these were not published in full until 1932.

His later life was a run of bad luck. A dairy business failed in 1845, his marriage broke up in 1846, and in 1853 and 1854 he was twice imprisoned for debt. He lived in part on translations, among them eight volumes of Say and Smith, and in 1852 published a Geschichte der Reaction (History of Reaction). He died in Berlin in 1856 at the age of 49. His wider influence began only when the writer John Henry Mackay started promoting him in 1889.

Spooks in the Head

Stirner’s starting question is simple. From every side, he says, he is handed a cause he is supposed to serve: the cause of God, of humanity, of truth, of liberty, of the people, of the prince. Only his own cause is never supposed to be his concern. He turns this around and ends the preface with the sentence: “Nothing is more to me than myself!”

What he fights against he calls “spooks” or “fixed ideas”: general concepts that stand above the real human being and demand sacrifices from him. “Man, your head is haunted; you have wheels in your head!” he writes in the section on the possessed in the first part. He means not only gods but just as much “Man,” morality, the fatherland and society.

This is where his criticism of his contemporaries, the critics of religion, begins. They had toppled God, he says, and put “Man” in his place, who must now be met with the same reverence. In the introductory part of the section “The Owner,” he sums this up in a sentence that still provokes today: “Our atheists are pious people.” He sees the same pattern in liberalism, which he divides into a political, a social and a humane variety and rejects in all three forms, because each subordinates the individual to an ideal, whether the citizen, society or humanity.

Every State a Despotism

Stirner writes against the state with a sharpness that was rare in the Vormärz, the period of repression in the German states before the revolutions of 1848. In the section “My Power” he writes: “Every State is a despotism, be the despot one or many, or (as one is likely to imagine about a republic) if all be lords, i. e. despotize one over another.” What matters to him is the demand to obey the law, no matter who passed it. Even the resolution of a popular assembly remains an alien will.

He sees just as clearly the double standard of the authorities: “The State’s behavior is violence, and it calls its violence ‘law’; that of the individual, ‘crime.’” What a private person may not do without being punished, the state does under another name. In “My Intercourse,” Stirner also describes how the state pushes itself between people. Workers who try to force higher wages, he says, are treated as criminals, and thoughts are tolerated only as long as they are the state’s own: “My ways must be its ways, else it distrains me; my thoughts its thoughts, else it stops my mouth.”

Part of this is an observation about property under the rule of the state. Whoever owns only what the state leaves him, and what it can take back at any time through expropriation, seizure or lawsuits, is in Stirner’s view not an owner but a vassal: “Under the dominion of the State there is no property of mine.”

The Union of the Self-Interested

What does Stirner put in the place of state and society? He speaks of the “union of egoists,” an association one enters because it is useful and leaves again when it is no longer useful. He puts the difference this way: “the society is sacred, the union your own; the society consumes you, you consume the union.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy describes this union as a constantly shifting alliance in which people join together without giving up their self-determination.

What is remarkable for friends of liberty is how soberly Stirner judges exchange and reciprocity. Against the socialists’ hope for a society of love, he writes: “But I would rather be referred to men’s selfishness than to their ‘kindnesses,’ their mercy, pity, etc.” Self-interest, he argues, asks for something in return and can be won over, whereas mercy can only be begged for. He rejects the communism of Wilhelm Weitling because it decrees a “true welfare” for all and denies the individual his own welfare.

Nor does he preach an overthrow. Revolution and insurrection, he says, must be distinguished: “The Revolution aimed at new arrangements; insurrection leads us no longer to let ourselves be arranged, but to arrange ourselves, and sets no glittering hopes on ‘institutions.’” According to the Stanford Encyclopedia, Stirner saw no general duty to fight the state. The individual should decide case by case, and the state would fall apart as soon as egoism spread.

Where It Does Not Fit

So far, much of this sounds familiar. The break begins where Stirner applies his method to what thinkers of liberty regard as the protection of the individual. If the state is a spook, then for him so is law. He calls it a “wheel in the head,” put there by a “spook,” and instead derives everything from his own strength: “I am entitled to everything that I have in my power.” He mocks the “sacred, inalienable rights of man,” and anyone who appeals to them deserves, in his words, to be laughed at.

For property this has immediate consequences. Stirner does not defend it as a right but declares it a question of force: “What I have in my power, that is my own.” Legally protected private property, he says, is not a fact but “a fiction, a thought.” With regard to the possessions of others he knows no limit except his own weakness, for their goods are his, and he disposes of them to the extent of his power. A sentence from “My Intercourse” shows the logic without detour: “Whoever knows how to take and to defend the thing, to him it belongs till it is again taken from him, as liberty belongs to him who takes it.”

Against Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, who called property theft, Stirner does raise a shrewd objection: “Accordingly property is not theft, but a theft becomes possible only through property.” But he is not defending the owner. Proudhon, he says, should simply admit that the aim is to take the goods of the few, and in any case bourgeois property deserves “the attacks of the Communists and Proudhon.”

Between people, too, there is no obligation for him. “We owe each other nothing, for what I seem to owe you I owe at most to myself.” He sees others as means: “No one is my equal, but I regard him, equally with all other beings, as my property.” The Stanford Encyclopedia notes that Stirner allows the egoist to break his own word as well, and that it follows from his teaching that even murder, incest and infanticide could be justified. He is not a nihilist in the strict sense, it says, because he affirms self-determination as a good, but he knows no rule that also binds the stronger.

One has to be precise here. That Stirner recognizes no natural law does not separate him from all liberals. Ludwig von Mises, for example, unlike Murray Rothbard, did not believe in natural rights and justified liberty by its consequences for social life. The real difference lies deeper. Whether grounded in natural law or in experience, liberalism relies on general rules that forbid taking and protect exchange. Stirner’s union, by contrast, lives solely on the shifting balance of power among its members, and a ban on enriching oneself at the neighbor’s expense holds there only as long as the neighbor can defend himself.

What Can Be Learned from Him

Even so, he is worth reading. Hardly anyone has described so precisely how power hides behind grand words. Since Stirner, anyone who demands sacrifices in the name of the people, society or the common good has had to face the question of whom this sacrifice actually benefits. His observation that the state calls its own violence law and the same act by a citizen a crime belongs to the basic stock of every critique of the state.

His skepticism toward world improvers who prescribe a “true welfare” for the individual applies to today’s paternalism as well. His praise of self-interest over begged-for mercy recalls the idea of Adam Smith, whose work Stirner himself translated into German, that people help each other most reliably when both sides gain something from it. Friends of liberty, too, can ask themselves whether a principle they no longer examine has not itself become one of those “wheels in the head” he warns against.

His influence was felt above all among the anarchists. In the circle around Benjamin Tucker and his magazine Liberty, he found enthusiastic readers in the late 19th century, and the Stanford Encyclopedia counts his book among the founding texts of individualist anarchism.

A Solvent, Not a Foundation

Max Stirner thoroughly disenchanted the state and spared nothing in the process, not even the concepts on which opponents of the state rely. His critique works like a strong solvent: it strips the varnish from claims to rule, but it attacks just as much the rights that protect the weak from the strong. Whoever lets him sharpen their thinking gains an alert eye for every form of appropriation. Whoever looks to him for a reason why no one may take another person’s property will come away empty-handed. For the question of what ground a free society should stand on, one has to rely on other thinkers.

Further reading

  • Max Stirner: Der Einzige und sein Eigentum, Leipzig 1845 (many later editions, freely available at Projekt Gutenberg-DE, in German); in English as The Ego and His Own, translated by Steven T. Byington (1907)
  • David Leopold: “Max Stirner,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (revised 2023)
  • Rainer A. Bast: “Stirner, Max,” in: Neue Deutsche Biographie 25, Berlin 2013 (in German)

This article is part of our series on thinkers, doers and historical figures of liberty.

Sources

  • Stirner, Max: Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum, Otto Wigand, Leipzig 1845 [published in November 1844]; quoted from the text at Projekt Gutenberg-DE (in German), https://projekt-gutenberg.org/authors/max-stirner/books/der-einzige-und-sein-eigentum/chapter/2 (preface) to /chapter/16 (The Unique One); passages cited by part and section.
  • Stirner, Max: Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum, digital first edition in the Deutsches Textarchiv (in German), https://www.deutschestextarchiv.de/book/show/stirner_einzige_1845
  • Leopold, David: “Max Stirner,” in: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first published 2002, revised October 29, 2023, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/max-stirner/
  • Bast, Rainer A.: “Stirner, Max,” in: Neue Deutsche Biographie 25 (2013), pp. 359–360 (in German), https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/sfz81452.html
  • Liebmann, Otto: “Stirner, Max,” in: Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie 36 (1893), pp. 258–259 (in German), https://de.wikisource.org/wiki/ADB:Stirner,_Max
  • Mises Wire: “Mises and the Lockean Proviso” (on Mises’ rejection of natural law), https://mises.org/mises-wire/mises-and-lockean-proviso

Leave a Comment

Popular:

Tip: press / or Ctrl+K to open search from any page.